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Abstract: The debate on the Marxist nature of the PSOE has resulted in less attention being paid to the 
influence of Republican doctrine on the party.  The leftist Spanish Republicans were not only the Socialist’s 
“travelling companions”, but provided much of the PSOE’s ideology. Federalism and the problem of 
nationalism, agrarian reform, the importance of education and the need to embrace the middle class and 
intellectuals, made the PSOE just another Republican party. Once Spanish Socialism abandoned the German 
orthodoxy of the theory of two worlds, and given their lack of true understanding regarding Marxist thought, 
Spanish Republicanism became the genuine reference point for the PSOE until Francisco Franco’s death.   
 
Key Word: socialism, republicanism, Spain. 
 
1. Introduction: Spanish Socialism returns from exile  
 
On 20 November 1975 Francisco Franco died at the age of eighty-three. His death 
marked the end of one of the longest-lived dictatorships in western Europe, a product of the 
world prior to World War II which was sustained by post-war bloc politics. One year earlier, 
in October 1974, Felipe González began to take the reins of the historical Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español (PSOE) – the Spanish Socialist Workers Party. During the XXVI Congress of 
the Party, held in the French city of Suresnes, González and the renovadores proposed 
bringing the PSOE out of the obscure exile that had reduced the party to little more than a 
symbolic organization with some 7000 members. In that same year, the Socialist Party had 
defined itself as a working-class party whose most immediate objective was to wrest power 
from the Communist Party (PCE), which held control over the leftist opposition to Francoism 
within the country.  
 
The death of the dictator precipitated the events. No longer was it a question of 
opposing the dictatorship, but its legacy, making it essential that the party exert a decisive 
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influence on the transition to democracy.  This was the task undertaken in December 1976 
during the XXVII Congress of the PSOE, held in Spain for the first time in forty-four years.  
The party needed to establish its political presence in society, occupy the political arena that it 
had been denied during the Franco regime and be visible in the media if the organization were 
to consolidate itself and make its place in a society that was experiencing a political revival 
following four decades of dictatorship.  The task of reconstructing the party and making it 
visible to society was not yet considered incompatible with the PSOE’s Marxist political line, 
which had been endorsed in the previous congress.  Indeed, amidst the battle being waged 
with the PCE, the party’s recognition of its Marxist nature was considered an essential step 
for it to become the predominant leftist party. As González declared in 1976, “When we say 
that our party is Marxist, we have serious reasons for doing so”.1 The Spanish transition, 
however, would lead the PSOE (and the PCE) down a very different road than the one 
envisaged by its leaders following Franco’s death. 
When the PSOE held its first congress in Spain after returning from exile, party 
membership numbered a scant ten thousand. Yet just a few months later, with a still weak 
organization, it became the principal opposition party.  On 15 June 1977, in the first post-
Franco democratic elections, the PSOE won 29.3 per cent of the vote and 118 parliamentary 
seats, while the PCE, the genuine opposition force to the dictatorship, would have to settle for 
9.4 per cent of the vote and 20 parliamentary seats. The Francoist right – drawn together 
around the figure of Manuel Fraga Iribarne, former Franco minister who created the Alianza 
Popular (AP) to run in the elections -  fell in behind the PCE, attaining a mere 8.3 per cent of 
the vote and 16 seats. The Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD), the party headed by Adolfo 
Suárez made up of former moderate Francoists including Suárez himself and liberal 
reformers, won the elections with 34.6 per cent of the vote and 166 seats. As said at the time, 
Spanish society overwhelmingly chose to be represented by two centre parties that would be 
capable of steering the country towards the Spanish Constitution of 1978.2 
In 1977, Spanish society saw in the PSOE what the party leaders still chose to ignore: 
a centre-left party that was more liberal-socialist than Marxist, willing to accept the Monarchy 
and modernize society without radically reformist tactics. It was a party, which in an express 
tribute to the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, and not to Marx, wanted to convert Spain into 
an advanced capitalist country.  Indeed, it was a party that would ultimately accept neo-liberal 
principles in its economic programme (as occurred several years later when the PSOE came 
into power). This contradiction between the party’s radical ideological base and its practical 
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policy of moderate reform, would not take long to manifest itself. When the PSOE gained 
only two more seats than it had in 1977 in the elections of March 1979 - after the new 
democratic Constitution had been passed - voices led by Felipe González began to speak out 
for the need to redefine the party’s lines with a view to the XXVIII Congress. As one 
prominent Socialist leader pointed out, “González went to the meeting with the idea of 
making the party a government alternative”. Felipe González’s team wanted to “adapt the 
party to the social reality”, meaning that first it had to renounce Marxism - it was a question 
of being “Socialists before Marxists”.3  Nonetheless, the proposal to convert the PSOE into a 
Social-Democratic party akin to other European parties that would be capable of shedding its 
old Marxist trappings and governing without radical reform, was defeated by ample majority 
in the XXVIII Congress. Although 68 per cent of those attending the congress supported the 
party platform, 61 per cent rejected the proposal to drop Marxism. What the party members 
wanted was a Marxist party led by Felipe González, who, to everyone’s surprise, resigned as 
General Secretary. A committee was then set up with a view to the forthcoming Extraordinary 
Congress that was to be held in September 1979. At that congress González was re-elected 
General Secretary with 86 per cent of the vote and the party finally agreed to renounce its 
Marxist dogma and former radical rhetoric. The triumphant reformist sector of the PSOE saw 
in the Extraordinary Congress its own Bad Godesberg – the Congress of ’59 in which the 
German Social Democrats decided to abandon Marxism – while the radical wing felt that the 
change in the party line was a betrayal of “the revolutionary spirit of Pablo Iglesias’s party”.4 
It is not true, however, that the revolutionary spirit of the PSOE was betrayed in the 
Extraordinary Congress.  Not even in the most dramatic moments of the Spanish Civil War 
had the PSOE been a revolutionary party.  The radical wing seemed to have forgotten the 
pragmatic and reformist temperament of the party’s founder Pablo Iglesias, clinging instead to 
a very superficial concept of Marxism – a “decaffeinated” Marxism5- that kept them from 
seeing exactly what the PSOE was renouncing.  What came to light in the Extraordinary 
Congress was not so much the skin-deep Marxism of the PSOE as the Republican-Democratic 
influence that the party had assumed with quite some effort since the late nineteenth century 
until the Second Spanish Republic in 1931. In order for the party to be a government option, 
the PSOE did not have to choose, as has often been said, between Felipe González and Marx, 
but between Republicanism and Liberalism. In the pages that follow we shall see how the 
process of “republicanization” experienced by the PSOE began with its creation in 1879 and 
how the party rid itself of its Republican vestiges following Franco’s death. The Liberalism of 
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the PSOE during the transition from dictatorship to democracy would ultimately bring the 
party to power in 1982, leading to the split in 1988 with the Socialist trade union, Unión 
General de Trabajadores (UGT); a rupture that marked the definitive end of the Republican 
influence in the PSOE. 
 
2.  The origins of Spanish Socialism: from the theory of the two worlds to the Republican-
Socialist Conjunction  
 
 In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, European Socialists attempted to follow to 
the letter, albeit with greater or lesser success, the doctrine of the “two worlds” or of the two 
shores, developed by the German Socialist Party (SPD). According to this doctrine, the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariats belonged to two radically different and opposing worlds in 
which the disappearance of the former was a necessary prerequisite for the existence of the 
latter: 
 
“the world of possessors and the world of the dispossessed, the world of capital and the world of work, 
the world of the oppressors and the world of the oppressed, the world of the bourgeoisie and the world 
of socialism: two worlds with opposing purposes, aspirations and visions, with different languages, 
two worlds that cannot coexist, where one must displace the other”6 
  
This was how Wilhelm Libknecht, one of the most prominent leaders of the SPD, 
expressed himself in 1871. In this clear manner, he set down one of the principles that would 
be firmly established in 1875 in the Gotha Programme of German Social Democracy: the 
working class is self-reliant and compared to it all other social classes are a “reactionary 
mass”.7 The mission of the Socialist Party was, therefore, to create its own world in the heart 
of the bourgeois world. The working class had to read its own newspapers, attend its own 
schools and establish technical universities. It was necessary to lay the foundations for a 
proletarian culture that would displace the capitalist world. Although Marx bitterly rejected 
the idea of two worlds in their Critique of the Gotha Programme in a defence of the old 
Republican-Democratic ideal that the working class could unite with more progressive 
members of the middle class and peasants, the official stance of the SPD would come to be 
considered the quintessence of orthodox Marxism by the end of the nineteenth century.  
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Imbued with the “orthodox” spirit of the time, a handful of workers from Madrid led 
by Pablo Iglesias founded the Partido Socialista Obrero Español in 1879 and the Unión 
General de Trabajadores (UGT) nine years later in 1888 to “live completely removed from all 
bourgeois parties and take political action as a workers’ party”.8 Like the SPD, the Spanish 
Socialist workers wanted to create their own world and displace the bourgeoisie. But unlike 
the SPD, the Spanish Socialists did not have a sufficiently strong industrial working class to 
support the project.  In an agrarian country like Spain, the orthodox posture of the Socialists 
prevented them from consolidating their forces since by considering peasants and the petit 
bourgeoisie a reactionary mass they were essentially turning their backs on the social reality 
of the country. In 1903, fifteen years after the PSOE was founded, Antonio García Quejido, 
one of the party’s most notable leaders, called for a pact with the progressive Republicans 
owing to the poor success of the party’s working-class strategy. Although the pact was 
rejected, the main leaders of the PSOE, Pablo Iglesias among them, adopted a less optimistic 
rhetoric on the revolutionary possibilities of the proletariat, what he called “a clear ideological 
evolution towards reformism that follows the lines set down by European Social 
Democracy”.9  The constant fall in party membership, the Socialist disaster in the elections of 
1907 and the events of the Tragic Week10 finally convinced Pablo Iglesias of the need to 
come out of isolation and reach a pact with the Republicans in 1909. That pact – or the 
Republican-Socialist Conjunction as it was called then – would win Pablo Iglesias a seat in 
the Chamber of Deputies in 1910.11  
 
Thus, little more than twenty years after it was founded, the PSOE, like a great many 
Socialist parties in Europe, abandoned the theory of two worlds to sit in a bourgeois 
parliament alongside a progressive bourgeois party: the Unión Republicana of Nicolás 
Salmerón. The pact with the Republicans was not just a means to an end, nor was it simply an 
electoral tactic employed by Spanish Socialists and Republicans, but ushered in a series of 
important changes in Spanish Socialism, converting the PSOE “into one more Republican 
party”.12  As a result, the PSOE’s programme acquired an increasingly solid theoretical base.  
Firstly, the PSOE took the “agrarian problem” seriously for the first time, commissioning a 
detailed plan for reforming rural Spain. Peasants were no longer deemed to be a reactionary 
mass, but a crucial element in the party’s development. Accordingly, the UGT proposed 
penetrating the peasant world, which had hitherto been dominated by Republicans and 
Anarchists.13  Secondly, influenced by Republican Federalism, the Socialists began to show 
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interest in the “regional problem”, a matter which had been overshadowed by Socialist 
internationalism.  The party’s neglect of the regional problem, like that of agrarian reform, 
meant that Spanish Socialism would not take as strong a hold as hoped for in Catalonia or the 
Basque Country, in spite of the fact that these were the two most industrially developed 
regions of Spain. With the notion of the two worlds at its height, the PSOE viewed the 
Catalan and Basque demands as a bourgeois political problem: the proletariat lacked a 
homeland and would not find it in Catalonia or the Basque Country.  The Catalan working 
class, influenced by the popular Federalist Republicanism of Catalonia, joined the ranks of 
Federalist Anarchism, of the reformist Socialism of Solidaridad Catalana or even the 
conservative Republicanism of the Lliga Regionalista.  Coinciding with the Conjunction, a 
debate got underway in the PSOE on the importance of wooing the most advanced members 
of Catalanism over to the Socialist terrain.  Although this strategy initially failed, the debate 
on the much-needed alliance between Catalanism and Socialism would prompt the Socialists 
to refer to Catalonia as an “oppressed nation” and to propose a “Republican Confederation of 
Iberian Nationalities” in its political programme.14  
 
Thirdly, in practice, the Conjunction involved renouncing the idea of two worlds.  
Class interests were gradually transformed into national interests, while the enemies of the 
working class were no longer the bourgeoisie en bloc, but the plutocracy and their bulwark in 
Spain: the Bourbon Monarchy of Alfonso XIII. The most radical antagonism was not felt 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariats, but between Republicans of all makes, be they 
Socialists or not, and supporters of the Monarchy:  
 
“Down with the Monarchy! –demanded Pablo Iglesias in 1917- Onward with the Republican 
regime, which will in turn permit the bourgeoisie to reach full development and aid the 
proletariat in becoming a strong force, notably influence national issues and accelerate the 
happy moment of putting an end to social antagonism!”15 
 
The coalition with the Republicans led Pablo Iglesias to propose a gradual, reformist 
defence of the struggle for Socialism. The most urgent task was not to take power by means 
of a revolution, but to bring about a change in the regime and transform Spain into a 
democratic state: 
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“The task of renewal, the task of making Spain capable of embarking upon a new life and 
marching to the drumbeat of other nations is the work of another regime and other politicians.  
The regime must be democratic and the men whom it serves must be inspired by the desires of 
the nation and possess a will capable of overcoming any obstacle.  This is how we can escape 
from the prostration in which we live, move quickly ahead in the political, economic, civil and 
religious order and prepare the ground so that socialism, which is conquering the Power in 
other nations, will take control of it in Spain, and lay down the foundations for the new social 
order that must benefit all.”16 
 
The pact with the Republicans not only permitted a Socialist deputy to occupy a seat in 
the Spanish Parliament for the first time ever, but also provided other countless benefits to the 
PSOE and the UGT.  In 1909 the Socialist Party attained 53 councillors - 30 more than they 
previously had – for a total of 135 in 1913. Furthermore, from 1907 to 1917 membership in 
the PSOE rose from 6000 to 13,600, while the UGT, with scarcely 57,000 activists in 1905, 
increased its membership to over 140,000. In a country lacking a developed working class, 
Republicanism, rather than Marxism, was the only means for the Socialists to gain ground.  
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century the Spanish Republicans were going full 
force in an attempt to offer society a unitary party that could draw together the diverse 
factions dividing them since the Revolution of 1868; a revolution that had resulted in the 
short-lived First Spanish Republic.17  Since that time, Spanish Republicanism had been split 
into three factions: a leftist faction which was radical, democratic, federalist and insurgent, 
and whose ideals were founded on the French Revolution of 1848 and in the fraternal 
Republicanism of Louis Blanc and Auguste Blanqui.  No doubt this was the most influential 
tendency of Republicanism and the one that found greatest support among the working 
classes of Spain.  In the centre, with Nicolás Salmerón at the head, were the Republicans who 
rejected insurgency and promoted the institutional route in the struggle for a parliamentary 
majority that would favour the transition from the Monarchy to the Republic.  The Republican 
right, which was in favour of participating alongside the Liberals in the governments of the 
Alfonso XIII Monarchy, played an insignificant role in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth.  The Republican left and centre - the factions that 
exerted the greatest influence on the PSOE – were distinguishable by their greater or lesser 
passion for insurgency, albeit they defended a series of common doctrines: 
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a) Freedom was defined in classical terms as being in opposition to slavery.  
b)   The state was viewed from a federalist standpoint. 
c) Not only did the Republicans promote the absolute separation between Church and 
State, but prided themselves on their anti-clerical stance. 
d) Lacking in a developed economic theory, oppression was condemned on moral 
grounds in consonance with the Republican ideal of freedom. 
e)  Finally, the concept of “illustrated rationalism” was defended above all.18 
 
For the Republican left, the revolution had to reject all authority, be atheist, popular, 
fraternal and radically democratic as the Republic must be governed by “the people, the 
productive classes of society, artists, artisans, workers”.19  It should come as no surprise, then, 
that in Spain - a country on the periphery of capitalism fed up with the abuse of power by the 
Monarchy - Anarchism took a stronger hold than Socialism, since the Spanish Anarchists 
were “former Republicans turned Libertarian”.20  When the Socialists eschewed the concept 
of two worlds, it was natural for them to turn to democratic Republicanism in order to gain 
ground in the cities and countryside alike. Spanish Socialism turned to Republicanism not 
only in a pragmatic gesture to accept the Conjunction, but because it had, in effect, adopted 
much of the rhetoric, principles and objectives of the Republican left in the early twentieth 
century.  Thus, for the first time, Socialism truly began to take root among the country’s 
working class.  The agrarian problem, a central topic of reflection by the Republican Joaquín 
Costa, brought the Socialists even closer to the agrarian world.21  The national question - 
which Republicanism had never ignored given its federalist tradition and was of utmost 
importance to the Catalan Republicans - became the subject of increasing debate among the 
Socialists, who had previously held no position whatsoever on the topic.  The need for a 
universal system of basic education in an overwhelmingly illiterate country such as Spain was 
a matter of great concern to the Republicans of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza and yet 
another of the Socialists’ demands. And finally, the struggle for a Social Republic as a 
previous step towards Socialism became the principal theme of Pablo Iglesias’s writings from 
the beginning of the century until his death in 1925.  
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3. The influence of the Russian Revolution and collaboration with Primo de Rivera 
 
 The most original Spanish political thought and the influence on the working classes 
thus fell within the Republican realm. Socialism, which in Spain had no notable theoreticians, 
gained political weight and theoretical clarity with the Conjunction.  But unlike the Socialists 
- who had rallied around the PSOE and the UGT until the emergence of the Third 
International largely owing to Iglesias’s pragmatism - the Republicans had a long tradition of 
splitting into factions and families to which they remained loyal. The efforts made by Nicolás 
Salmerón to reunite all these families bore their fruit in 1903, as we have said, with the 
creation of the Unión Republicana.  Yet in 1908 Republicanism became divided yet once 
again. From its core emerged two new parties: the Reformist Party, led by Melquíades 
Álvarez and Gumersindo de Azcárate, who supported collaboration with the Liberals in the 
government; and the Radical Party of Alejandro Lerroux with a marked populist line.22  
However, it was not the Republican division that most affected Spanish Socialism (which in 
fact maintained the Conjunction until 1920), but the split in the heart of the organization  – as 
occurred in the rest of Europe – following the Russian Revolution and the creation of the 
Third International.  
 The failure of the general revolutionary strike called by Socialists, Republicans and 
Anarchists for March 1917 with the aim of ousting Alfonso XIII and forming a Constituent 
Assembly, convinced Pablo Iglesias that Spain was not prepared for an undertaking of this 
kind.  Following the triumph of the Russian Revolution, the Socialist leader wrote an article 
in which he rejected the usefulness of the Russian case for Spanish Socialism:  
 
“To us they seem to be short-sighted, poor observers, if not verging on the reactionary, those 
who express the belief that a revolutionary movement in Spain would be the inevitable 
consequence of a state or situation equal to that which exists in Russia today. Are the 
conditions in Spain the same as those in that country when czarism fell?  Are the characters of 
the two peoples the same? Are the circumstances here the same as there?  We do not believe 
so.  And if this is the case, we judge it dangerous to speculate what would happen in Spain if 
there were a strong political upheaval, the same as in Russia”23 
 
 This was the official stance taken by a Socialist Party which, like other European 
Socialist parties, finally broke up after refusing to form part of the Third International. The 
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birth of the Communist Party was viewed by the PSOE as a drama with two far-reaching 
consequences. On the one hand, Pablo Iglesias opted for a “Liberal Socialism”; for the 
reformist and parliamentary route to improve the country’s situation in general and that of the 
working class in particular, choosing to promote a diffuse Socialism that “all would praise 
and bless” in the future.24  For Iglesias, “the Liberals who the Socialists defeat are Liberals in 
name only, while the Socialists are Socialists for real”.25  The triumph of the English 
Labourist MacDonald in 1924 proved Iglesias right regarding the “road of dementia” taken by 
the Communists.  Iglesias’s condemnation of capitalism took on a more moral than political 
tone, and “in no moment was there concern for elaborating a strategy which, from the 
Socialist movement, would permit raising the question of political change”.26 Spanish 
Socialism was thus depoliticized and the founder of the PSOE eschewed all reflections of a 
Marxist nature just as he had been doing for several years.  
 
 On the other hand, however, the pressure exerted by the Communists led some 
Socialists to return to the party’s late nineteenth-century working class dogma, to recover the 
former notion of two worlds.  Given the lack of a clear Socialist strategy by Iglesias to curb 
Communism and Fascism, the theory of two worlds prevailed once again in the heart of a 
PSOE now led by Francisco Largo Caballero and Julián Besteiro. This marked the end of the 
Conjunction in 1921 and the beginning of collaboration with the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. 
World events did not pass inadverted in Spain, in spite of the fact that the country had not 
taken part in World War I.  In fact, Spain’s neutrality during the war served to enrich the 
haute bourgeoisie which, with the aid of liberal governments, conservative governments and 
the Monarchy, did a booming business with wartime Europe.  Meanwhile, the working class 
suffered great hardship and the peasants went hungry, that is, when they were not sent to die 
in Morocco in a pointless colonial war in which Spain chalked up one defeat after another. 
The continual strikes and demonstrations fomented by Socialists and Anarchists from 1918 to 
1923, as well as the military disaster of Annual (Morocco) for which no one wanted to take 
responsibility, led to a political crisis in ’23 that ultimately ended in a coup d’etat carried out 
by General Miguel Primo de Rivera and endorsed by King Alfonso XIII.    
 
 Unlike the Communists and Anarchists, the Socialists condemned the coup, but 
persuaded their rank-and-file not to mobilize against the dictatorship until they were able to 
ascertain the course adopted by the military government. The justification for the position 
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taken by the most prominent leaders of the PSOE, Francisco Largo Caballero and Julián 
Besteiro, was the following: neither the Constitutional Monarchy nor the dictatorship were 
democratic regimes and therefore akin to one another. Now, if the dictatorship respected 
worker’s rights, the Socialists would cause no problems. Consequently, after several meetings 
between leaders of the PSOE and General Primo de Rivera, the Socialist Party decided to 
collaborate with the military government.27  In 1924 the Ministry of Labour was set up with 
Largo Caballero as State Adviser to represent the UGT. The military regime, with its sound 
logic, directed its repression at the Communists and the Anarchists, while respecting Socialist 
headquarters, locales and activists.   The PSOE refused to see what the entire left – including 
Communists, Anarchists and Republicans- clearly saw, that is, that the dictatorship was a 
regime established to defend a protectionist bourgeoisie in economic terms and a proto-fascist 
bourgeoisie in political terms.28 This political short-sightedness would cost the party dearly 
since the PSOE’s participation in the Ministry of Labour did not, contrary to what they 
believed, serve to promote labour laws in benefit of the workers. The rupture of the 
Conjunction divided the PSOE and the middle class, while the party’s collaboration with the 
regime distanced it from the workers in the party.  Indeed, by 1928 the PSOE had 8000 
members, as many – or as few – as at the end of the nineteenth century.29 Given this situation, 
the Socialists toyed with the idea of turning the Socialist Party into a sort of labour party akin 
to the British experience. Yet if the country was not ripe enough for a proletariat revolution, it 
was certainly less prepared to have a labour party similar to the one in Great Britain rise to 
office.   
 
  The Primo de Rivera regime continued on its course, taking on the task of drawing the 
Spanish right together into one large party in 1925 - la Unión Patriótica- which would oversee 
the transition to a parliamentary monarchy. With this aim, a National Assembly was 
announced that would eventually take place in September 1927.  Once again the PSOE 
debated the question of whether or not to participate in the Assembly, a proposal that was 
finally rejected due to the corporatist nature of the meeting. It should be pointed out that this 
decision likely saved Spanish Socialism from its complete demise given that the PSOE’s 
relationship with the dictatorship had begun to wane and its participation in the Assembly 
would have been poorly looked upon by the working class. Furthermore, following the death 
of Pablo Iglesias, the new leaders of the PSOE, namely Fernando de los Ríos and Largo 
Caballero, proposed that the party once again side with the Republican movement. The PSOE 
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thus joined in forging the Pact of San Sebastian for the Republic, coming to form part of the 
Republican Revolutionary Committee in 1930, which had planned an uprising for October 28 
of that same year.  Ultimately, the uprising did not go ahead, but the Republican movement 
was so strong by that time and the Monarchy and dictatorship so weak that on 14 April 1931, 
King Alfonso XIII fled the country and the Second Spanish Republic was proclaimed without 
a single drop of blood being shed.30 
 
4.  The Second Republic: the renovation of the Republican-Socialist alliance 
 
 Once again Spanish Socialism was kept afloat by becoming Republican. This is what 
Julián Besteiro was referring to in 1931 when he said: “Spanish Socialism should not only be 
an organization that defends the Republic, but the main political instrument of its perfection 
and progress”.31 Nonetheless, in both the Republican and the Socialist movements, certain 
changes had come about that merit examination in order to better understand the Republican-
Socialist alliance. Spanish Republicanism had experienced some bad moments during the 
twenties.  While republics were being established throughout the majority of European 
countries in the aftermath of World War I, the Spanish Monarchy continued to enjoy relative 
stability. When this was no longer the case, the Monarchy adhered to the Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship with great success, at least in the beginning.  Yet it was precisely this dictatorship 
that would lead to the resurgence of the Republican movement; a movement which took firm 
root among the working class.  Because the dictatorship effectively dismantled the former 
political regime that had legitimized and maintained the king on the throne - a Constitutional 
Monarchy that allowed Conservatives and Liberals to govern in turn through fixed elections – 
the very Monarchy was discredited. Republican sentiment spread like wildfire throughout the 
country. Both old and new Republicans – Lerroux’s Radicals, the Radical-Socialists, Manuel 
Azaña’s Acción Republicana and the Catalan Republicans – signed the Pact of San Sebastian 
in 1930 in favour of the Republic, an event which the Socialists were invited to attend.32  
Some months after the failed insurgency movement of December 1930, a new Republican-
Socialist coalition swept the board in local elections, thus confirming the King’s popular 
discredit.  
 
 Following Pablo Iglesias’s death in 1925, the Socialists were lacking a figurehead that 
could draw together the different tendencies in the party. Although it was not a wholly 
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categorical division, it can be said that three families coexisted within the PSOE.  The first of 
these was the working-class right represented by Julián Besteiro, who yearned for the old 
Social-Democratic orthodoxy of the two worlds. His continual refusal to mix with bourgeois 
parties and the error of supporting collaboration with the dictatorship had much to do with the 
disastrous situation experienced by the PSOE in the twenties. On the left was Largo 
Caballero, who committed much the same error. The left-wing sectors led by Caballero 
swung from revolutionary maximalism to the working-class dogma of Besteiro without any 
clear criteria. In the centre, Indalecio Prieto represented positions that were closer to the late 
reformism of Pablo Iglesias.33 Once again, after drawn-out debates on the convenience of 
participating or not with the Republicans in the Revolutionary Committee and in the 
municipal coalition, the Socialists – with  Caballero and Prieto at the head – decided to regain 
lost ground by forming a new Republican-Socialist alliance. After some months of a 
provisional government in which the PSOE participated, the Republicans maintained the 
coalition with the Socialists in order to run in the elections of June 1931 whose aim was to 
open the constituency process. In the opinion of the Republicans, this was the best way for the 
working class to feel that they formed part of the new political regime. The Republican-
Socialist bloc gained the majority in Congress and the Socialists strengthened their presence 
in the government.  The PSOE, with 114 seats, thus became the most important party in the 
Republican Chamber. Prieto was appointed Minister of Finance, Fernando de los Ríos, 
Minister of Justice and Largo Caballero, Minister of Labour.34  
 
 What role did the Socialists play in the first government of the Second Republic? 
Their main task consisted of consolidating the Republic before embarking upon Socialist 
policies that would radically transform society. Prieto, the Minister of Public Works since 31 
December, undertook the ambitious General Plan for Hydraulic Works to carry out irrigation 
projects in the Extremadura region.  Largo Caballero passed a series of measures to protect 
workers’ rights that did not, in any way, threaten the latifundista (large landholding) structure. 
Nevertheless, businessmen and landholders became concerned about trade union 
interventionism, a fact that led them to unite against Republican social reformism and demand 
that the Socialists abandon government.  On the other hand, Fernando de los Ríos promoted a 
Republican constitution that was openly inspired in the Constitution of the Weimar Republic. 
The Socialist Luis Jiménez de Asúa, one of the most important members of the committee in 
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charge of drafting the Constitution, vehemently stressed the Republican-Democratic nature of 
the Spanish Constitution:  
 
“The two-chamber system is clearly in decadence and we have observed that when the people 
have made widespread demands, a single chamber was established.  This occurred, for 
example, in France in 1791 and in 1848; the same thing occurred in Spain in the Cortes of 
Cadiz…Therefore, given that our Constitution is highly democratic, we will establish a single 
Chamber. The two-chamber system is exceedingly harmful.”35 
 
 Nonetheless, the Republican-Socialist alliance, incapable of quelling landowner 
resistance, failed in its pursuit to develop rural Spain through agrarian reform.  This was 
further exacerbated by the crisis that occurred in the heart of the Republican coalition.  
Pressured by the bourgeoisie and landholders, Lerroux’s Radical Party demanded that the 
Socialists be expelled from government.  Socialists and the Republican left – particularly the 
Prime Minister Manuel Azaña – considered the Republican foundational pact to be inviolable 
and viewed the presence of the Socialists in the government as the only means to integrate the 
working class. Finding his request rejected, Lerroux’s Radical Party abandoned the 
government, leaving Manuel Azaña’s small party, the Acción Republicana, in the minority.36   
 The role played by the Socialists was, then, a clearly modernizing one. Their short-
term objective was not so much to carry out a Socialist revolution, but instead to put Spain on 
a par with more developed neighbouring countries.  But the country was not even prepared for 
this, particularly the bourgeoisie, who founded a party with the explicit aim of defending their 
interests. The Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA) won the elections in 
1933, the same year the party was created, and the left, including the PSOE, took an even 
more radical position.  Events were occurring at a very fast pace and everything seemed to be 
leading to the disaster of 1936. In October 1934, a poorly organised working-class rising in 
Asturias was easily and brutally quashed by the army. Once again, the internal divisions of 
the PSOE came to light: Largo Caballero was convinced that the failure of the Revolution in 
Asturias signified nothing less than the beginning of a revolutionary period that would end in 
victory for the Socialist revolution. Prieto, on the other hand, believed that the events in 
Asturias should put an end to the policy of a working class front united against the right in 
order to strengthen the alliance with the Republican left.37 The split in the PSOE between the 
Prieto “left” and the Caballero “right” was definitive.  Prieto’s posture would eventually win 
out when the Communist International encouraged a policy of popular front alliances. Thus, 
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the creation in 1936 of the Popular Front – in which Republicans and Socialists once again 
joined forces accompanied now by Communists – did not have as its objective the struggle for 
Socialism, but the consolidation of a Republic and a democracy opposed to the belligerent, 
fascist-minded Spanish right. The Civil War soon dashed this hope and Spain, which the 
European democracies turned their backs on, fell into the hands of a fascist dictatorship that 
would survive – albeit under various guises at different times – until the death of Francisco 
Franco in 1975.  After the war “the PSOE was detained in time, practically reduced to a party 
in exile”.38 
 
5.  The Liberal Socialism of Felipe González 
 
 When Felipe González occupied the post of General Secretary of the PSOE in 1974, 
he encountered a party with more or less the same number of members as it had had at the end 
of the nineteenth century.  Furthermore, given that it had been in exile, the party lacked 
influence within the country and was alien to the vicissitudes of Spanish politics.  The PCE 
had become the genuine leftist opposition force against Francoism and created a trade union, 
Comisiones Obreras, which unlike the UGT, was working to improve working conditions 
directly in the factories.  González found a Marxist party – as he himself defined it - that had 
no desire whatsoever to follow in the footsteps of the Social-Democratic parties of Europe. In 
short, he encountered a party radicalized by exile and which envisaged in the recent 
Revolution of the Carnations in Portugal or the expulsion of the monarchy and the fall of the 
Dictatorship of the Colonels in Greece, a model to bring back the Republic and democracy to 
southern Europe. Given this context, it is likely that González found it easy to insist that the 
PSOE was a Marxist party.  However, five years later, in 1979, with 120 deputies, hundreds 
of mayors, councillors and party representatives, he no longer believed this position 
advisable.39 According to Felipe González, the time had come for the PSOE to follow the 
road taken by the most important Social-Democratic parties of the Socialist International; the 
same ones that had lent him so much support (particularly the German party of Willy Brandt 
and the French party of François Mitterrand). This was the moment, as we all know, when 
González raised the question of foregoing Marxism to become Socialist.  But did Spanish 
Socialism truly renounce Marxism? The doctrines renounced by the PSOE were more closely 
linked to the party’s Republican tradition than its weak Marxist tradition.  Spanish Socialism 
accepted the return of the Bourbon Monarchy and a less progressive Constitution in social and 
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political terms than that of the Republic with a Senate expressly designed to put a brake on 
proposals by a possible left-wing chamber.40 They accepted improvements in rural Spain that 
did not involve agrarian reform and contributed to designing a State of the Autonomies that 
was far removed from the Republican ideal of a federal Spain.  The Socialists did all of this 
with the aim of rising to power; an objective that was achieved in October 1982 by 
overwhelming majority, just one year after the coup attempt that had the country on 
tenterhooks.41  From this viewpoint, then, the pragmatism of González not only reaped its 
rewards, but put the party on the path of reformism initiated by Pablo Iglesias. Republican 
Socialism was thus converted into a theoretically weak Liberal Socialism.42 With a light 
Social-Democratic patina in education, social services and health, Felipe González favoured 
the neo-liberal policies of Miguel Boyer, first Minister of the Economy under the PSOE.  As 
Carlos Solchaga, Minister of Industry in the Socialist government, who succeeded Miguel 
Boyer in the Ministry of the Economy in 1985 explains: 
 
“There were two trends in the Government. One, represented by Boyer, followed the 
macroeconomic guidelines of the OECD and the Bank of Spain, which defended reducing the 
deficit and controlling public spending; the other trend, a majority in any Social-Democratic 
party, was in favour of spending more on everything. I took the middle position, although I 
increasingly leaned towards Miguel Boyer’s position. There was an atmosphere of tension, but 
it was settled by Felipe González in favour of Miguel Boyer.”43 
 
Naturally, a high price had to be paid for González’s new Liberal Socialism. From 
1982 to 1988 the UGT had accepted a tough-minded policy of wage restraint and industrial 
‘reconversion’ to permit the country to continue to grow.  However, in ’88 the PSOE and the 
UGT broke off their relations and the trade union – together with Comisiones Obreras – 
called for a general strike that was an enormous success.  The trade unions believed that the 
transition to democracy had been pursued at the expense of the working class, which had lost 
its social and economic power.44 The strike, which forced the PSOE to take a more socially-
oriented political line that was more favourable to the economic interests of the working class, 
did not weaken Gónzalez’s electoral appeal. Indeed, for the third time running, González once 
again won the elections by absolute majority, and in 1993 he won for the last time with a 
relative majority.  Although Felipe Gonzalez’s liberal political programme led to the rupture 
with the UGT, voters confided in him until 1996, the year in which he lost the elections in the 
aftermath of a series of scandals for corruption.   
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6. Conclusion 
 
The debate on the Marxist nature of the PSOE has resulted in less attention being paid 
to the influence of Republican doctrine on the party.  The leftist Spanish Republicans were 
not only the Socialist’s “travelling companions”, but provided much of the PSOE’s ideology. 
Federalism and the problem of nationalism, agrarian reform, the importance of education and 
the need to embrace the middle class and intellectuals, made the PSOE just another 
Republican party. Once Spanish Socialism abandoned the German orthodoxy of the theory of 
two worlds, and given their lack of true understanding regarding Marxist thought, Spanish 
Republicanism became the genuine reference point for the PSOE until Francisco Franco’s 
death.  When Felipe González took hold of the party reins, he was no longer confronted with 
the dilemma of choosing between Socialism and Marxism, but between Republicanism and 
Liberalism.  The situation of the PSOE at the end of the seventies had nothing to do with that 
of the SPD at the end of the fifties. The PSOE faced a transition from dictatorship to 
democracy in which the politicians of the Franco regime, together with the King, actively 
took part in designing the future Spanish democracy.  In this context, the PSOE adopted a 
liberal concept of politics, not a Republican one (and much less so a Marxist one), as a means 
of survival. The long drawn-out evolution of Republicanism to Liberalism is a better 
reflection of Spanish Socialism than the rejection of a supposed Marxist dogma that never 
truly served as an inspiration for the party’s activities or political doctrines.    
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